Making Bread From Broken Eggs: A Basic Recipe for Conflict Resolution Using Earned Sovereignty by Kirschner, Nathan P.
1Making Bread from Broken Eggs: A Basic Recipe for Conflict Resolution Using 
Earned Sovereignty 
Nathan P. Kirschner1
I. Introduction 
 
The idea of state sovereignty is one of the most important and contentious issues in 
international law.  It is an abstract concept that has evolved over time with important 
effects.  Many recent and ongoing conflicts, such as those in Southern Sudan, Georgia, 
Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Aceh, Iraq, and Bougainville, revolve around the idea of 
sovereignty.  This article examines the concept of earned sovereignty2 and shows that its 
core elements taken alone are a step-by-step approach to keeping disputants involved in 
conflict resolution, while its optional elements are parts of a toolkit to be used in 
facilitating the step-by-step approach laid out by the core elements of the theory.  A 
review of recent practice shows that the core elements of earned sovereignty offer a 
three-part roadmap for conflict resolution beginning with shared sovereignty, continuing 
through institution building, and ending at a determination of final status.  Other parts of 
the theory, called optional elements, are tools stakeholders in a conflict situation may use 
in order to move from one core element to another until a final status solution is obtained.  
Though the optional elements of phased sovereignty, conditional sovereignty, and 
constrained sovereignty are parts of earned sovereignty they need not always be used.  In-
depth analysis of the peace agreements in Southern Sudan, Bougainville, and Aceh show 
that, while the core elements are implemented throughout, the optional elements are used 
to varying degrees and in some instances not at all. 
 
Before delving too deeply into earned sovereignty, Part II of this article examines the 
concept of state sovereignty in international law, finding that is an important, if 
complicated subject, and makes the point that a step-by-step approach to accumulating 
sovereignty such as earned sovereignty is useful in conflict resolution.  Part II concludes 
by finding that the concept of sovereignty is fluid in practice, and it is this fluidity that 
makes it particularly useful. 
 
Part III provides a general discussion of earned sovereignty as an important and 
perfectible concept, and uses a bread baking analogy to show the relationships between 
the core elements and the optional elements.  Part IV demonstrates how those 
relationships are expressed in international practice using Southern Sudan, Bougainville, 
and Aceh as case studies.  Finally, Part V concludes that the core elements alone can 
provide a pared-down version of earned sovereignty useful in conflict resolution, while 
 
1 Nathan P. Kirschner is an Appellate Attorney at the United States Department of Veterans’ Affairs, Office 
of the General Counsel, Professional Staff Group VII.  He is a member of the Advisory Council of Public 
International Law and Policy Group (PILPG).  The views expressed in this article are the views of the 
author alone.  The author would like to express his gratitude to Professor Paul Williams, Dr. Francesca 
Jannotti Pecci, and Kristi Barlow for their insightful comments on an earlier version of this article. 
2 See generally, Paul R. Williams, Michael P. Scharf, and James R. Hooper, Resolving Sovereignty-Based 
Conflicts: The Emerging Approach of Earned Sovereignty, 31 DENV. J. INT’L. L. & POL’Y 349 (2004); Paul 
R. Williams and Francesca Jannotti Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap Between Sovereignty and 
Self-Determination, 40 STAN. J. INT’L L. 347 (2004). 
2the optional elements retain their usefulness as tools to help implement and secure the use 
of the core elements. 
 
II. Sovereignty Is One of The Premier Issues Facing International Law In The 
Twenty-First Century 
 
Issues concerning sovereignty of states and substate entities are some of the most 
important and complex issues debated in the international legal community today.  As 
Lorie M. Graham stated, “Let me just close by saying that in the last six weeks I have 
heard it twice stated that the defining issue in international law for the 21st century is 
finding compromises between the principles of self-determination and the sanctity of 
borders [….]”3 Diane Otto agreed that the idea of state sovereignty was a one of 
immediate importance, “There is little doubt that states’ sovereignty is being contested by 
contemporary developments both locally and supranationally.”4
Though scholars may agree that sovereignty is an important concept, discussions of 
sovereignty are often complicated.  Sovereignty has been referred to as an imprecise, 
subjective term, referring to many different belief systems over time.5 However, 
sovereignty retains relevance: functionally as an organizing principle, and politically as a 
symbol of national self-identity.6 This belief is affirmed by Dan Sarooshi, who wrote on 
the relationship between sovereignty and international organizations, stated that,“[t]he 
characterization of sovereignty as an essentially contested concept has an important real-
world manifestation in relation to international organizations. He concept of sovereignty 
being inherently unstable and in a constant state of having its core criteria subject to 
contestation and change has the consequence that there is no single, or indeed 
authoritative, definition that can be given to the concept.”7
3 See Lorie M. Graham, International Law Weekend Proceedings: Self-determination for Indigenous 
Peoples after Kosovo: Translating Self-determination “Into Practice” and “Into Peace”, 6 ILSA J. INT’L
& COMP. L. 455 (2000).  
4 Diane Otto, A Question of Law or Politics?  Indigenous Claims to Sovereignty in Australia, 21 SYRACUSE 
J. INT’L L. & COM. 65, 100 (1995); see also Helen Stacy, Relational Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2029 
(2003).  Stacy, in putting forth the concept of Relational Sovereignty, argues that, “Sovereignty is a concept 
that reflects both the historic conditions at the time of its initial conception, and the philosophical and 
intellectual moods of the moment.  In other words, the conceptions of sovereignty at the foundation of legal 
and political theory arose out of contingencies of history, rather than as the result of any immanent logical 
necessity in history or in the development of political thought. (fn64)” 
5 Jenik Radon, Sovereignty: A political Emotion, Not a Concept, 40 STAN. J. INT’L L. 195, 208 (2004).  In 
the Commemorative Introduction to the Commemorative Issue: Balance of Power: Redefining Sovereignty 
in Contemporary International Law, Radon goes on to say that sovereignty is a critical focal point in 
academic exploration because of the contemporary controversy surrounding its proper place in world order. 
6 Id.
7 See Dan Sarooshi, Diversity or Cacophony?  New Sources of Norms in International Law Symposium: 
Article: The Essentially Contested Nature of the Concept of Sovereignty: Implications for the Exercise by 
International Organizations of Delegated Powers of Government, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1107, 1110 
(Summer 2004). 
3Taken at its most simple, the basic rule for international legal sovereignty is that 
recognition is extended to entities, states, with territory and formal juridical autonomy.8
Even if one takes a more complicated view of sovereignty as an abstract concept, as a 
practical matter, some scholars, including Stephen Krasner, believe that, “Today, stability 
requires more than maintaining a balance of power among strong states.  Safety […] 
depends on the ability of the United States and the international community to make 
sovereignty work – to establish democracies that improved the lives of ordinary 
individuals rather than of the ruling elite.”9
It is therefore important to study sovereignty, with all its variation, in order to better 
understand, prevent, and end conflicts within and among states. 
 
This article bases its arguments regarding sovereignty upon the definition of sovereignty 
as a bundle of rights, including external and internal governing rights.10 It is this idea of 
sovereignty that allows the theory of earned sovereignty to function. 
 
A. Most Recent Conflicts Revolve Around Sovereignty 
 
Many recent and ongoing conflicts concern the central problem of sovereignty: what are 
powers reserved to government; who exercises which of them; and how should they be 
exercised?11 If one looks at recent and ongoing conflicts such as those in Southern 
Sudan, Bougainville, and Aceh one finds that they revolve around the issues laid out as 
external or internal governing rights by Williams and Heymann. 
 
B. A Step-By-Step Approach to Accumulating Sovereignty Is Useful in Conflict 
Resolution 
 
Stakeholders involved in many conflict and newly post-conflict situations often do not 
know where to begin.  Once the peace process begins, the parties have no idea how to 
proceed, and progress is often hampered by unclear, divergent objectives that lead to 
impasses.  In many post-conflict situations conditions go unmet or important steps fail to 
 
8 Stephen Krasner, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY, 14, Princeton University Press, Princeton 
(1999). 
9 Krasner, S.J and Pascual, C., “Addressing State Failure,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, Number 4, page 163, 
July/August 2005. 
10 Paul Williams and Karen Heymann, Earned Sovereignty: An Emerging Conflict Resolution Approach, 10 
ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 437, 442-443 (2004) (The external sovereign rights may include the right to 
territorial integrity; the right to defend the state through the use of force; the right to govern my 
establishing, applying and enforcing law; the capacity to act as a legal entity for owning, purchasing, 
transferring property, etc.; grant of sovereign immunity for noncommercial activities and consular 
relations; capacity to sign international agreements; the duty to respect other nations; and the obligation to 
abide by international law.  Internal sovereign rights may include taxation; determining governing 
structures and political policies; providing for social welfare; regulating the judicial system; creating 
internal law; and managing state infrastructures). 
11 See Sarooshi, supra note 6, at 1110 - 1112, on the contestation of sovereignty by international 
organizations in relation to the contestation of sovereignty between Nation-States.  Sarooshi believes that 
the these questions are the central problems surrounding the concept of sovereignty. 
4take place as scheduled.  The importance of formulating strategies to keep disputants 
engaged in settlement processes should not be underestimated.12 Recent experience in 
peace negotiations has proven that keeping the parties engaged in the development and 
implementation of a peace plan is by far the most difficult challenge, hence the 
importance of a guideline like earned sovereignty. 
 
The parties themselves, regional organizations, international organizations, 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) often must work together to keep peace 
negotiations and peace implementation on track.  Scholars have proposed, for example, 
that the United Nations (UN) could construct a positive sanctions regime to enhance a 
given community’s sense of identity.13 If the UN placed more faith in reward-based 
strategies clearer rules and regulations governing their use would need to be developed.14 
Earned sovereignty fits into this model of conditional engagement and positive sanctions.  
The core elements outline a set of steps that show constant rewards for progress in 
obtaining, and preserving, peace:  sharing sovereignty fosters dialogue between the 
stakeholders; institution building fosters competence in the substate entity and provides 
both the stakeholders and the international community with assurance of future 
competency; determining final status of the substate entity, whether it is autonomy, 
independence, or something else entirely, gives the parties an idea of an ultimate reward, 
a goal that all parties can attempt to attain.   
 
The optional elements, with the possible exception of constrained sovereignty, keep the 
parties on track by rewarding them for tasks accomplished during the implementation 
process.  Phased sovereignty rewards the substate entity with increased sovereignty over 
time.  This “timer” on sovereignty rewards the original state with peace for the duration 
of the phased sovereignty period.  It rewards the substate entity with a gradual delegation 
of authority to the substate entity.  It rewards both parties with a period of time in which 
to continue dialogue and solicit aid from the international community.  Conditional 
sovereignty again rewards the substate entity with increased sovereignty, this time for 
meeting certain conditions using a quid pro quo arrangement.  It rewards the original 
state with a quid pro quo system that allows the original state to set, to some degree, the 
conditions necessary for the substate entity to obtain increased sovereign rights or 
powers.  Finally, constrained sovereignty rewards the substate entity with increased 
sovereignty, though not independence or, necessarily, as much sovereignty as it had 
originally desired.  The original state is rewarded with restrictions on the conduct of the 
substate entity, which could provide, for example, a measure of increased security for the 
original state.  
 
12 See Edward A. Amley, Jr., Peace by Other Means: Using Rewards in UN Efforts to End Conflicts, 26 
DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 235 (1998). 
13 Id at 283. 
14 Id at 296. 
5C. The Concept of Sovereignty Is Fluid in Practice 
 
There are numerous articles and books that attempt to define sovereignty and statehood.15 
Some even go so far as to argue that sovereignty, by its very nature, is undefinable, and it 
is that very lack of definition that gives the intellectual discussion surrounding the 
concept such great importance.16 For example, a recent article in The Economist showed 
that many Western diplomats think that it is unrealistic for Serbia to retain any kind of 
link to Kosovo.  Some are mulling the idea of conditional independence, which would 
break the link with Serbia and replace the present UN mission with a new body that 
would have considerable reserve powers to keep the province under tight international 
control for years to come.17 The idea of conditional independence, similar to that of 
earned sovereignty, takes the idea of sovereignty out of its strict historical sense, and 
lends credence to the theory that a modern idea of sovereignty involves the distribution of 
a bundle of rights. 
 
III. Earned Sovereignty Is an Important and Perfectible Concept; Optional 
Elements Are Means To The End of Achieving Final Status 
 
This section will show that the concept of earned sovereignty, when pared down to the  
core elements, offers a step-by-step approach to using a reward-based system to keep 
disputants engaged in settlement processes.  It will further demonstrate how, in practice, 
the optional elements are in fact parts of a toolkit to be used in facilitating the step-by-
step approach laid out by the core elements of the theory. 
 
A. Core Elements: Shared Sovereignty, Institution Building, and Determination of 
Final Status as Eggs, Flour, and Bread as an End Product 
 
The core elements, outlined in this section, are the indispensable components in the step-
by-step process of conflict resolution through earned sovereignty.  The first step is 
delegation of certain responsibilities to the substate entity in shared sovereignty.  The 
second step involves an increase in the capacity of the substate entity to undertake those 
responsibilities through institution building.  Finally, the third step, determination of final 
status, involves determining a level of responsibility to be exercised by the substate entity 
that will satisfy the original state, the substate entity, and the international community.  
 
15 See generally e.g. Krasner; Scott Pegg, International Society and the De Facto State, 187-192, Ashgate 
Publishing Company, Brookfield (1998).  Pegg argues, quoting Victor Li, that ‘From an international law 
perspective, a de facto entity may clearly conduct foreign relations with countries which have not extended 
de jure recognition to it…’ and that de facto states already have some degree of “juridically cognizable” 
existence.  He discusses how the status of de facto statehood could be conferred upon Eritrea before 
independence, Tamil Eelam, The Republic of Somaliland, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.  He 
also briefly suggests that, at some point in history, Biafra, Rhodesia after its unilateral declaration of 
independence, Charles Taylor’s Liberia, the Southern Sudan, Chechnya, Krajina, the Bosnian Serb 
Republic, Kosovo, the Trans-Dniester region of Moldova, Abkhazia, Kurdistan, the Karen and Shan states 
of Myanmar, the Muslim-controlled areas of Mindanao in the Philippines, the Khmer Rouge-controlled 
areas of Cambodia, and Taiwan, also qualify as potential de facto states. 
16 See Sarooshi, supra note 7, at 1110-1111. 
17 ECONOMIST, Independence dreams: A Serbian province heads towards full independence, 51-52, Jun. 4 – 
Jun. 10, 2005. 
6The entire process could be analogized to baking bread.  The parties must begin with 
eggs and flour and desire the baking process to result in bread. 
 
i. Shared Sovereignty: the Eggs 
 
Each case of earned sovereignty is characterized by an initial stage of shared sovereignty, 
whereby the state, the substate entity, and possibly the international community may 
exercise some sovereign authority and functions over a defined territory.18 Which parties 
exercise what parts of sovereignty over the substate entity varies from case to case.  For 
example, in Kosovo, though Serbia retains legal sovereignty over the province it has been 
administered by the United Nations for years, with some authority delegated to a local 
government.19 In other situations, such as Bougainville, sovereignty is shared between 
the state and the substate entity, without any administrative authority being ceded to the 
international community.20 This still allows for the participation of the international 
community in a supporting role.21 
ii. Institution Building: the Flour 
 
The substate entity, frequently with the assistance of the international community, 
undertakes to construct new institutions for self-government, or modify those already in 
existence, to develop the institutional capacity for exercising increased sovereign 
authority.22 This institution building often takes place during the period of shared 
sovereignty and sometimes prior to the determination of final status.  It can come in many 
forms, from the creation of new administrative organizations, as is currently happening in 
Southern Sudan, to the modification of already existing institutions, such as the Public 
Service of Bougainville, discussed infra. The methods of institution building are 
determined on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the need for the new institutions 
to aid in the reconciliation process and possibly implementing confidence-building 
measures in order to bring a satisfactory settlement to the conflict. 
 
iii. Final Status: Bread as an End Product 
 
The third core element is the determination of the final status of the substate entity and its 
relationship to the parent state, which is invariably conditioned on the consent of the 
international community based upon international recognition.23 This element may be 
 
18 See Williams and Jannotti Pecci, supra note 2 at 355. 
19 Id at 358-359. 
20 See generally Bougainville Peace Agreement, Aug. 30, 2001, Papua N.G.-Bougainville, available at 
http://www.usip.org/library/pa/bougainville/bougain_20010830.html (last visited Sep. 26, 2006) 
[hereinafter Bougainville Peace Agreement]. 
21 See e.g. Bougainville Peace Agreement, supra note 20; see also Memorandum of Understanding 
Between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement, Aug. 15, 2005 
[hereinafter MoU], available at http://www.thejakartapost.com/RI_GAM_MOU.pdf, (last visited Jul.13, 
2006), signed August 15, 2005 (specifically the provisions relating to the establishment of the Aceh 
Monitoring Mission (AMM)). 
22 Williams and Jannotti Pecci, supra note 2 at 355. 
23 Williams and Jannotti Pecci, supra note 2, 355-356. 
7decided at any time during the peace process: before an agreement is signed, in the 
agreement itself, or after implementation of the agreement. 
 
B. Optional Elements as Means to Achieving the End of Final Status: the Timer, the 
Yeast and Counting Calories 
 
In the original presentation of earned sovereignty certain processes were attached to the 
core elements and were termed optional elements.24 The optional elements of phased 
sovereignty, conditional sovereignty, and constrained sovereignty are outlined below.  
Section C, infra, will discuss how the optional elements are not specific parts necessary 
for a conflict resolution scenario to be termed earned sovereignty.  Instead, they are tools 
used to move from one core element to another, eventually arriving at a determination of 
final status. 
 
i. Phased Sovereignty: The Timer 
 
Phased sovereignty entails the accumulation by the substate entity of increasing 
sovereign authority and functions over a specified period of time prior to the 
determination of final status.25 An example would be setting a specified time for a 
referendum on independence and, until the date of the referendum, allowing the substate 
entity participation in the national government so that it could gain competency and 
experience within a pre-determined timeframe.26 Application of phased sovereignty to 
the conflicts between Sudan and Southern Sudan, Papua New Guinea and Bougainville, 
and the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) are discussed in 
Section IV. 
 
Phased sovereignty is the timer in the bread baking analogy.  Once the ingredients are 
mixed – at least two parties, shared sovereignty, and institution building – they are put in 
the oven of phased sovereignty and the timer is set.  While the international community 
waits, and possibly participates in institution building, the processes take place that will 
eventually produce a final status solution acceptable to all stakeholders 
 
ii. Conditional Sovereignty: The Yeast 
 
Conditional sovereignty may be applied to the accumulation of increased sovereign 
authority by the substate entity, or it may be applied as a set of standards to be achieved 
prior to the determination of the substate entity’s final status.27 The first manifestation of 
this tool involves a quid pro quo arrangement between the two parties.  The example of 
the Roadmap to Peace in the Israeli/Palestinian conflict springs readily to mind.  The 
Roadmap is set out as a “performance-based plan” under which the parties must perform 
 
24 Williams and Jannotti Pecci, supra note 2, 351, 355-356, 366-370. 
25 Williams and Jannotti Pecci, supra note 2 at 356. 
26 See generally the discussion of the Sudan and Bougainville peace agreements infra.
27 Williams and Jannotti Pecci, supra note 2 at 356. 
8certain obligations in order to ensure progress through the different phases of the plan.28 
Failure to comply with obligations impedes progress under the Roadmap.29 The second 
manifestation of this tool involves the substate entity fulfilling a number of criteria, with 
the eventual return on their investment being a determination of final status. 
 
To once again use a cooking analogy, conditional sovereignty is like using certain critical 
ingredients to make a dish.  The quid pro quo aspect is embodied in the idea that if one 
wants to make chocolate chip cookies one must use chocolate chips.  The important 
factor is the use of chocolate chips.  If the baker fails to use chocolate chips plain cookies 
result.  The second interpretation of conditional sovereignty, which involves fulfilling a 
number of steps before attaining final status, could be analogized to making an entire 
three-course meal, advertising chocolate chip cookies as dessert.  If the host forgets to 
add the chocolate chips the guests may leave disappointed.   
 
iii. Constrained Sovereignty: Counting Calories 
 
The third optional element, constrained sovereignty, consists of applying limitations on 
the sovereign authority and functions of the new state.30 In analyzing instances of 
constrained sovereignty it is especially useful to think of sovereignty as a bundle of 
rights.  For an entity to be entirely “sovereign,” when using the bundle of rights theory, it 
must possess all of the external and internal governing rights described in Section II.  In 
constrained sovereignty some of the governing rights are not devolved to the substate 
entity.  Instead, they are retained by the original state or, in some instances, transferred to 
the international community. 
 
Going back to the bread analogy, constrained sovereignty is what happens when, for 
whatever reason, the parties bake too little bread.  The parties have added all the right 
ingredients, the bread cooked for the appropriate time, they followed all the appropriate 
steps in the recipe, and now it is ready to eat. The bread is perfectly good but there is too 
little of it.  It may be necessary for each party to get less bread than they had hoped to 
ensure that all parties get a piece, whether that decision is taken amongst the parties 
themselves or imposed by an outside facilitator (the host of the party, to follow the 
analogy).  Most would agree, however, that it is better to have some bread than none at 
all. 
 
C. Optional Elements are Means to the End of Final Status 
 
The optional elements of earned sovereignty, as outlined above, are therefore tools to 
facilitate the transition from one core element to another, with the eventual goal of 
determining an acceptable final status for the substate entity.  To continue the analogy 
above, final status is the ability to eat bread.  It is the ability to exercise mutually 
 
28 See A Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian 
Conflict, Apr. 30, 2003, available at http://www.un.org/News/dh/mideast/roadmap122002.pdf (last visited 
Jul. 9, 2006) [hereinafter Roadmap]. 
29 See Roadmap. 
30 Williams and Jannotti Pecci, supra note 2 at 356. 
9acceptable levels of whatever may be called “sovereignty” by the state, the substate 
entity, and the international community. 
 
IV. Demonstrative Cases 
 
Earned sovereignty is currently being used, in practice if not in name, in a number of 
conflict and post-conflict situations around the world.31 In order to illustrate the breadth 
of its use, and the diverse ways in which its core and optional elements can be used, or 
interpreted as being used, the author has chosen to examine the peace agreements that 
have been, and are being, implemented in Southern Sudan, Bougainville, and Aceh.  
These conflicts were selected because they resulted in peace agreements that were 
relatively successful and could therefore serve as guides to the future application of 
earned sovereignty. 
 
A. Sudan
The signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Government of 
Sudan (GOS) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) marked the 
conclusion of a 21-year civil war that cost the lives of 1.5 million people.32 
As an introduction, it is important to note that the CPA is a name given to a collection of 
other Agreements and Protocols including, but not limited to, the Machakos Protocol, the 
Agreement on Security Arrangements, and the Protocol on Power Sharing.33 For that 
reason the CPA is certainly the most complicated peace agreement examined in this 
article, if not one of the most Byzantine drafted in recent memory.  In order to provide 
specific examples of the CPA’s provisions, particularly as they relate to the theory of 
earned sovereignty and the concept of sovereignty as a bundle of rights, this article will 
focus on the Implementation Modalities of the Protocol on Power Sharing dated 26 May 
2004.  In order to provide for ease of understanding the author will continue to refer to 
the agreement generally as the CPA. 
 
The CPA, specifically the portion noted above, is replete with examples of all the 
elements of earned sovereignty.  It satisfies the core elements because it contains 
numerous examples of shared sovereignty and institution building and provides specific 
means for the determination of final status.  It also contains examples of all three of the 
optional elements: phased sovereignty, conditional sovereignty, and constrained 
sovereignty.  Interestingly, and importantly, a number of the provisions do not fit neatly 
 
31 See generally Williams and Jannotti Pecci, supra note 2; See also, Karen Heymann, Earned Sovereignty 
for Kashmir: The Legal Methodology to Avoiding a Nuclear Holocaust, 19 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 153 
(2003).  
32 Country Profile: Sudan, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/country_profiles/820864.stm, 
(last visited July 10, 2006). 
33 See Agreement Between the Government of the Sudan (GOS) and the Sudan People’s Liberation 
Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLM/SPLA) on Implementation Modalities of the Protocols 
and Agreements (2004), available at 
http://www.usip.org/library/pa/sudan/cpa01092005/implementation_coversheet.pdf (last visited Jul. 13, 
2006). 
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into the above categories.  Instead, a number of them are hybrids of two (or more) of the 
elements that make up earned sovereignty. 
 
The CPA contains multiple examples of shared sovereignty.34 Perhaps the most 
important example, in terms of the political landscape of both the Sudan and Southern 
Sudan, is process outlined by the parties, and followed by them, in drafting an interim 
constitution.  In April 2005 the National Constitution Review Commission convened to 
draft the Interim National Constitution, which was ratified July 6, 2005.35 The National 
Constitution Review Commission (NCRC) is a body made up of representatives of both 
stakeholders tasked with drafting the interim constitution prior to the election of regional 
 
34 See generally Implementation Modalities of the Protocol on Power Sharing (2004), available at 
http://www.usip.org/library/pa/sudan/cpa01092005/implementation_agreement.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 
2007) [hereinafter Implementation Modalities of the Protocol on Power Sharing] (Though this article only 
discusses two examples in detail the CPA also utilizes shared sovereignty in a number of other situations, 
including the establishment of the referendum commission (activity 1(b)); the plan for repatriation, 
resettlement, reintegration, rehabilitation, and reconstruction (activity 2); establishment of the Assessment 
and Evaluation Commission (AEC) (activity 3); Improvement of institutions and arrangements created 
under the Agreement to making the unity of Sudan attractive to the people of southern Sudan (Activity 4); 
guarantees to safeguard agreement against Unilateral revocation and abrogation (Activity 5); the national 
reconciliation and healing process (NHRP) (Activity 7); the national population census (NPC) (Activity 8); 
the enactment of the National Electoral Law, including establishment of the National Electoral 
Commission, holding general elections, presidential elections, and elections for the post of President of the 
government of southern Sudan (Activity 9); the Council of States (Activity 11); establishment and 
convening of the National Assembly (Activity 12); determination of the scope of legislative competency of 
the National Assembly and the Council of States, respectively (Activity 13); election of Speakers, Deputy 
speakers, and other officers of the National Legislature (Activity 14); defining the functions of the two Vice 
Presidents (Activity 16); specification of appointments made by the President with the consent of the First 
Vice President (Activity 17); matters in respect of which the President shall take decisions with the consent 
of the First Vice President according to the Protocols and Agreements (Activity 20); representativeness of 
the administration of the National Capital (Activity 21); representation of the people of Sudan in the law 
enforcement agencies in the National Capital and provision for their adequate training (Activity 22); 
appointment of a special commission to ensure that the rights of non-Muslims are protected in the National 
Capital (Activity 23); clustering of National Ministries (Activity 25); allocation of seats on the National 
Executive (Activity 26); information campaign in all languages to popularize the Peace Agreement and 
foster national unity, reconciliation and mutual understanding (Activity 27); Establishment of the National 
Civil Service Commission (NCSC) (Activity 28(b)); establishment of the National Security Council (NSC) 
(Activity 31); establishment of the National Security Service (NSS) (Activity 32); identification of the 
security organs of the two parties and their assets (Activity 34); development and promotion of national 
languages, specifically enactment of a founding law (Activity 35(a)); establishment of the Human Rights 
Commission (Activity 36(b)); the Constitutional Court Act, including establishment of the Constitutional 
Court (Activity 37); establishment of the National Judicial Service Commission (Activity 38); Southern 
Sudan representation in the Constitutional Court, National Supreme Court, and other national courts in the 
Capital (Activity 39); submission and approval of the CPA t the National Assembly (NA) and National 
Liberation Council (NLC) (Activity 40); preparation of the Constitutional Text by the NCRC (Activity 42); 
preparation of other legal instruments as stipulated in 2.10 of PSP (Activity 43); organization of an 
inclusive constitutional review process (CRP); determination of North/South border of 1/1/56 (Activity 46); 
and establishment of the Abyei Area Council (Activity 56)). 
35 United States Department of State Background Note: Sudan, Bureau of African Affairs, January 2006,
available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5424.htm (last visited Sep. 26, 2006); see also 
Implementation Modalities of the Protocol on Power Sharing, supra note 34, Activity 41. 
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assemblies, particularly in Southern Sudan.36 A second equally important example is the 
institution of the Presidency.  Under the terms of the CPA the institution of the 
Presidency shall be composed of the President, the First Vice President, and the Vice 
President.37 Subsequent negotiations determined that the First Vice President shall be the 
President of Southern Sudan.  Following the death of Dr. John Garang, Salva Kiir was 
made the president of Southern Sudan and is currently acting as First Vice President of 
Sudan.38 Under the system developed in the CPA the President shall take some decisions 
with the consent of the First Vice President.39 This executive structure therefore provides 
an important and potentially powerful example of shared sovereignty, in which the 
national government cannot act without the consent of the substate entity.   
 
The CPA similarly contains many examples of institution building.  Most of the 
institutions of the newly created government of Southern Sudan must be cut from whole 
cloth.40 The CPA specifically calls for the establishment of no less than twenty-one new 
institutions at the state and national levels.41 The National Electoral Commission, the 
National Assembly, the Institution of the Presidency, the Human Rights Commission, the 
Constitutional Court, and the Judiciary of Southern Sudan are just a few examples of new 
institutions created by the CPA.42 
The international community in particular has recognized the importance of institution 
building since the signing of the CPA.43 In his report on the Sudan from January 2005, 
some six months after the signing of the CPA’s Protocols, United Nations Secretary 
General Kofi Annan (Secretary General Annan) stated that the assistance of the UN 
 
36 See Machakos Protocol, Jul. 20, 2002, para. 3.1.2, available at 
http://www.usip.org/library/pa/sudan/sudan_machakos07202002_toc.html (last visited 
Jul. 13, 2006).  See also Implementation Modalities of the Protocol on Power Sharing, 
supra note 34, at Activity 41. 
37 See Implementation Modalities of the Protocol on Power Sharing, supra note 34, at Activity 15. 
38 See, The CPA Monitor: Monthly Report on the Implementation of the CPA, May 2006 [hereinafter May 
CPA Monitor], para. 13, available at http://www.unmis.org/common/documents/cpa-
monitor/cpaMonitor_may06.pdf (last visited January 30, 2007).   
39 See Implementation Modalities of the Protocol on Power Sharing, supra note 34, Activity 20. 
40 International Crisis Group, Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The Long Road Ahead (2006), at 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/africa/horn_of_africa/106_sudan_comprehensive_peace_agr
eement_long_road_ahead_web.doc (last visited Jul. 11, 2006) (“With more than 50 national bodies and 
commissions to be formed, multiple systems and levels of governments (with the GOSS and southern state 
governments to be formed almost from scratch), the parties, partners and observers are understandably 
overwhelmed.”). 
41 See generally Implementation Modalities of the Protocol on Power Sharing, supra note 34. 
42 See Implementation Modalities of the Protocol on Power Sharing, supra note 34, Activities 9, 12, 15, 36, 
37, and 52. 
43 See Report of the Secretary General on the Sudan, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/2005/57, at 7 (2005).   
(To avoid these risks, strong and concerted strategies at both the national and international 
levels are required.  The Sudanese leadership, in collaboration with the international 
community, will need to identify ways to prevent competing interests from derailing the 
process.  To promote the inclusive implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, 
the new Sudanese leadership will have to promote its acceptance beyond its immediate 
constituencies to the wider body politic and civil society.  The new Government must take the 
lead, with the help of the international community, in starting to restore confidence and 
reconciliation in an all-inclusive national process.)   
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should be an all-inclusive national process.  The UN mission, he said, should work with 
the government of Southern Sudan (GOSS), including in the area of policy formation and 
planning.  A high-level representative of the UN mission should be present at all times in 
Southern Sudan.44 The Secretary General also said that the UN mission should include a 
public information component to assist the Government of National Unity (GNU) and the 
GOSS in providing an effective information capacity.45 A civilian police component 
should advise and assist both stakeholders in re-examining roles and functions [of police] 
and reviewing methods of operation.46 The rule of law section would be tasked to work 
with international partners to support legislative, executive and judicial institutions of 
GNU and Southern Sudan, including good offices and technical assistance in areas such 
as constitutional development and the strengthening of institutions and systems.47 
Finally, the section of the UN mission responsible for human rights should work with 
both parties to develop a local capacity including establishment of a Human Rights 
Commission.48 
44 See id at 12  
(While the mission’s headquarters would be based in Khartoum, a special office would be 
established in Rumbek, which would relocate should the government of southern Sudan decide to 
move its capital to another location.  This office would be charged with working with the 
government of southern Sudan, as well as managing the peace support operation, including policy 
formation and planning in the south.  Pending a final decision on the mission’s management 
structure for the interim period, at least one of the four members of the mission’s senior leadership 
(namely, my Special Representative, his two deputies and the Force Commander) would be 
present at all times in southern Sudan.).   
45 See id at 13  
(The public information component of this mission would seek to offer a clear, impartial, reliable 
and credible voice and information source for all stakeholders in the peace process.  The 
component would further assist the Government of National Unity and the government of southern 
Sudan by providing an effective information capacity, including through local and national radio, 
television and newspaper outlets, in order to promote understanding of the peace process and the 
role a United Nations peace support operation would play among local communities and the 
parties.). 
46 See id at 15  
(The civilian police component of the mission would work in close collaboration within bilateral 
international partners to advise and assist existing government police structures and the SPLM/A 
police force as they re-examined their roles and functions and reviewed their methods of operation 
to move away from military-style policing, which evolved in wartime, towards a style involving 
direct interaction with the community.). 
47 See id at 16  
(The rule of law component would ensure that the peace support operation was able to work 
closely with other international partners to support the establishment and operation of essential 
legislative, executive and judicial institutions of the Government of National Unity as well as the 
government of southern Sudan.  Accordingly, the rule of law component would offer good offices 
advice and technical assistance to support key processes in a number of areas, including 
constitutional development and the strengthening of legislative, judicial and correctional 
institutions and systems.). 
48 See id at 16-17  
(The human rights component of the peace support operation would work with the parties to 
develop and strengthen national and local capacity for the protection and promotion of human 
rights, including the development of an independent and effective national Human Rights 
Commission, which would be of particular importance.  The human rights component, working 
closely with the rule of law component and other international partners, would also assist national 
stakeholders in the development of a transitional justice strategy in accordance with the lessons 
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In June 2006, Secretary General Annan delivered another report to the Security Council 
on the Sudan.49 In it, he noted that the parties continued to make slow progress towards 
full implementation of the CPA and that, while the main structures are in place, many of 
the commissions charged with overseeing the implementation process are not being used 
effectively.50 Problems still exist with the formation and deployment of Joint Integrated 
Units.51 He expressed optimism in that Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and 
Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) soldiers were being redeployed on schedule, that the 
Ceasefire Joint Military Committee met regularly, and that the Assessment and 
Evaluation Commission has formed four working groups.52 He noted that a number of 
important commissions have yet to meet, and that though the membership of the National 
Constitutional Review Commission has been chosen, its original directive of ensuring the 
independence of CPA institutions was omitted from its new mandate.53 The United 
Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) had intensified efforts aimed at promoting 
reconciliation and conflict resolution in Southern Sudan, though tensions were increasing 
and its efforts were limited by various constraints.54 In March 2006 UNMIS assisted the 
GOSS in organizing its first review of rule of law institutions in Southern Sudan, and 
continued to provide policy expertise and support for reform of correctional institutions 
in the Sudan.55 
Secretary General Annan reported that in March 2006 the Sudan Consortium, which was 
organized by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (hereinafter IMF), and 
the UN, brought together representatives of the GNU, the GOSS, and 22 donor countries 
in Paris.56 Though donors again expressed support for a Multi-Donor Trust Fund 
managed by the World Bank disbursement remained very slow.57 
In his concluding observations, the Secretary General emphasized that the greatest 
challenge for Southern Sudan was creation of a true peace dividend.  He believed that the 
prospects for long-term stability would suffer if the gap between peace and a tangible 
improvement in peoples living conditions was not bridged.  In order for this to occur, he 
believed that the international community must ensure the provision of adequate 
resources for reconstruction and development.58 
learned and experience identified in my report on the rule of law and transitional justice in conflict 
and post-conflict societies (S/2004/616).). 
49 See generally Report of the Secretary General on the Sudan, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/2006/426 (2006). 
50 Id at 1. 
51 Id. 
52 Id at 2. 
53 Id. 
54 Id at 4. 
55 Id at 7. 
56 Id at 9. 
57 Id.
58 Id at 12. 
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The third core element of earned sovereignty, determination of final status, will be 
determined by referendum, tentatively scheduled for 2011.59 Activity 1 in the CPA is 
broadly titled “Self determination Referendum for the people of South Sudan” and sets 
forth that a referendum will take place six months prior to the end of the Interim Period.60 
Per the Machakos Protocol, the Interim Period is a period of six years following the Pre-
Interim Period, which began with the signing of the CPA and extended for six months 
thereafter.61 
The CPA therefore contains all of the core elements of earned sovereignty.  In essence, 
using these three basic tools, Southern Sudan should be able to obtain some form of 
increased sovereignty; that is, it can add to the bundle of sovereign rights it already holds.   
 
The CPA is also interesting, however, because it illustrates utilization of at least two of 
the so-called conditional elements of earned sovereignty: phased sovereignty and 
conditional sovereignty.   
Phased Sovereignty, the accumulation of increasing sovereign authority and functions 
over a specified period of time, can be seen throughout the CPA, wherein certain powers 
are granted to the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) and, later, the fledgling 
GOSS.  This process was to be implemented along a timeline, beginning, as discussed 
above, with the signature of the CPA and passing through a Pre-Interim Period, an 
Interim Period, enactment of the Interim National Constitution (INC) and finally ending 
in the Self-determination Referendum for the people of South Sudan.  This is probably 
the single greatest example of phased sovereignty in the CPA62 although whether 
Southern Sudan will obtain full sovereignty is dependant upon the outcome of the 
referendum.  Other examples of phased sovereignty, that do not rely on the outcome of 
the Self-determination Referendum, include conducting a census two years into the 
Interim Period,63 enactment of the National Electoral Law within six months from the 
start of the Interim Period, establishment of the National Electoral Commission within 
one month after the adoption of the Law, and general and presidential elections to be held 
not later than the end of the fourth year of the Interim Period,64 and establishment and 
convening of the Council of States and the National Assembly within two weeks of the 
adoption of the INC.65 At the outset, most of the provisions of the CPA were to happen 
within specified timeframes.66 
59 See May CPA Monitor, supra note 38 at para. 11 (“President Bashir visited Juba and Rumbek on 14 
February 2006 for the first time since Dr. Garang’s funeral [….] During his speech, President Bashir noted 
the right of the people of Southern Sudan to vote freely in the referendum in 2011.”).   
60 See Implementation Modalities of the Protocol on Power Sharing, supra note 34 at Activity 1. 
61 See Machakos Protocol, supra note 36 at paras. 2-2.5. 
62 See Machakos Protocol, supra note 36 at para. 2.5; see also Implementation Modalities of the Protocol 
on Power Sharing, supra note 34 at Activity 1. 
63 See Implementation Modalities of the Protocol on Power Sharing, supra note 34 at Activity 8. 
64 See Implementation Modalities of the Protocol on Power Sharing, supra note 34 at Activity 9. 
65 See Implementation Modalities of the Protocol on Power Sharing, supra note 34 at Activities 11-12. 
66 See, e.g., Implementation Modalities of the Protocol on Power Sharing, supra note 34 (Review of the 
feasibility of the dates set for census and elections (Activity 10), Preparation of the constitutional text by 
the NCRC (Activity 42), submission and approval of the CPA to the National Assembly and the National 
Liberation Council (Activity 40), establishment of an inclusive Southern Sudan Constitutional Drafting 
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A number of them have come to pass, though not always as scheduled.  President Bashir 
signed the INC into law on July 9, 2005, and the three-member Presidency was 
inaugurated that day.  The National Legislature, which consists of the National Assembly 
and the Council of States, was formed and convened on August 31, 2005.  The 
Government of National Unity (GNU) was established by four decrees issued by 
President Bashir on September 20, 2005 (this was done after considerable delay), and 
was formed largely in accordance with the CPA power-sharing formula.  Members of the 
GNU were sworn in on September 22, 2005.  On December 7, 2005, President Bashir 
established the National Judicial Service Commission.  The enactment of the National 
Judicial Service Commission Act properly passed through the National Assembly but 
bypassed the NCRC.  There was considerable difficulty with the establishment of the 
NCRC.67 
Conditional sovereignty, where certain benchmarks must be met for increased sovereign 
authority to be conferred upon the substate entity in a quid pro quo fashion, is also 
evident in the CPA.  For example, the Council of Ministers will be established prior to 
elections and within thirty days after the adoption of the INC.68 It therefore follows that 
the INC had to be adopted by both parties for the Council of Ministers to be established. 
The final optional element, constrained sovereignty, is not explicitly used in the CPA 
because it does not provide for restrictions on the sovereignty of Southern Sudan 
following the determination of final status.  One may infer from the text of the Machakos 
Protocol and the CPA that, should Southern Sudan decide not to remain part of Sudan in 
the 2011 referendum it will be entitled to the entire bundle of rights granted to a 
sovereign nation.   
 
The argument could be made, however, that prior to the 2011 referendum a form of 
constrained sovereignty is in effect in Southern Sudan.  This is similar to the current 
situation in Bougainville, which will be discussed below.  The most striking examples of 
 
Committee (SSCDC) (Activity 47), establishment of the first Southern Sudan Assembly (Activity 48), 
establishment of the Council of Ministers of the Government of Southern Sudan (Activity 51), 
establishment of the Judiciary of Southern Sudan (Activity 52), appointment of the President and Justices 
of Southern Sudan Supreme Court, Courts of Appeal and Judges of Other Courts (Activity 53), 
establishment of state legislatures (Activity 55), establishment of the Abyei Area Council (Activity 56), 
drafting and adoption of the state constitutions (Activity 58), and establishment of state Council of 
Ministers (Activity 59)). 
67 See May CPA Monitor, supra note 38 at paras. 13, 15, 16, 23, 30, and 38-41; see also The CPA Monitor: 
Monthly Report on the Implementation of the CPA, November 2006 [hereinafter November CPA Monitor], 
paras. 1, 3-7, available at http://www.unmis.org/common/documents/cpa-monitor/cpaMonitor_nov06.pdf 
(last visited January 30, 2007) (The NCRC originally prepared the INC.  President Bashir re-established the 
NCRC by decree on 7 January 2006.  Its mandate has been controversial, as President Bashir’s decree did 
not mention some functions assigned to the NCRC by the CPA.  The NCRC published a new Presidential 
decree on 8 October 2006 which was originally dated 6 June 2006.  This decree confirmed the mandate of 
the NCRC to prepare legal instruments as required to give effect to the CPA and confirmed a number of 
additional functions, including preparing model State constitutions in compliance with the INC and the 
Interim Constitution of South Sudan (ICSS)). 
68 See Implementation Modalities of the Protocol on Power Sharing, supra note 34, at Activity 18. 
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the use of constrained sovereignty in the pre-referendum period are the degree of control 
over Southern Sudan that is exercised by the GNU in Khartoum, as discussed above, and 
the integration of SPLA forces into Joint Integrated Units (JIUs).69 
B. Bougainville  
 
The Bougainville peace agreement between Papua New Guinea (PNG) and separatists on 
the island of Bougainville is probably one of the most comprehensive and successful 
applications of earned sovereignty.  The peace agreement, signed in 2001 in Arawa, put 
an end to a conflict on the island that had taken the lives of between 15,000 and 20,000 
people.  It also provided a framework for the election of an autonomous Bougainville 
Government.70 The PNG Government gazetted an agreed Constitution for the 
Autonomous Region of Bougainville in December 2004 that paved the way for elections 
and the establishment of an autonomous Bougainville Government.71 In June 2005 
Bougainville elected a president for its new autonomous government.  This election was 
seen as a key test of the 2001 peace agreement.72 
An in-depth examination of the Bougainville peace agreement shows that the 
stakeholders made use of all the elements of earned sovereignty.  The text of the 
agreement includes provisions outlining how sovereignty is to be shared, providing for 
institution building, and includes a strategy for achieving final status.  It uses the means 
of phased sovereignty, constrained sovereignty, and to a lesser extent conditional 
sovereignty to arrive at the endpoint of determining the final status of Bougainville. 
 
Two “lists” comprise the shared sovereignty component.  Section 5 of the peace 
agreement delineates a two list system for dividing powers and functions between the 
National Government and the autonomous Bougainville Government.73 According to the 
peace agreement the two lists will be “as exhaustive as possible” in outlining all the 
powers and functions of government, and for any issues that arise during the drafting of 
constitutional amendments, the agreement provides that the parties will consult and agree 
 
69 May CPA Monitor, supra note 38 at para 10 (The Joint Integrated Units (JIUs) Act was endorsed by the 
National Assembly on 17 January 2006.  The Act covers the establishment of the JIUs, their mandate, areas 
of deployment, uniform and common doctrine.  It also specified the rules relating to the formation of the 
Joint Defense Board (JDB) and its mandate); see also The CPA Monitor: Monthly Report on the 
Implementation of the CPA, December 2006 [hereinafter December CPA Monitor], paras. 308-316,
available at http://www.unmis.org/common/documents/cpa-monitor/cpaMonitor_dec06.pdf (last visited 
January 30, 2007) (Discussing the current status of the JIU Act, JIU strength and composition, and the 
JDB). 
70 See Country profile: Papua New Guinea, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-
pacific/country_profiles/1246074.stm, (last visited Sep. 29, 2006).  See also, Australian Government 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade: Bougainville Peace Process, 
http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/png/bougainville/ (last visited Sep. 26, 2006). 
71 Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade: Bougainville Peace Process, available 
at http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/png/bougainville/, (last visited Sep. 26, 2006). 
72 President Elected in Bougainville, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/4612685.stm (last visited 
Sep. 26, 2006). 
73 See Bougainville Peace Agreement, Aug. 30, 2001, Papua N.G.-Bougainville, § 5, available at 
http://www.usip.org/library/pa/bougainville/bougain_20010830.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2007) 
[hereinafter Bougainville Peace Agreement]. 
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on how they shall be resolved.74 It further provides that the constitutional laws 
implementing the peace agreement will supply a mechanism to deal with overlap and 
conflict between the two lists.75 The first list, which is provided in the peace agreement 
itself, demarcates the functions and powers of the National Government.76 The “list” of 
powers and functions provided to the autonomous Bougainville Government is not 
actually a list, but rather a catch-all provision stating that the autonomous Bougainville 
Government shall exercise the powers and functions not already delegated to the National 
Government, beginning with those available to provincial governments under the 
National Constitution, and to be developed while drafting the Constitutional laws 
implementing the peace agreement.77 Policing functions will also be divided between 
the autonomous Bougainville Government and the National Government.78 These 
examples show how the state, in this case Papua New Guinea, shares sovereignty with the 
substate entity, the autonomous Bougainville Government, prior to the determination of 
final status by referendum.79 
The institution building component of earned sovereignty is satisfied in the peace 
agreement itself by an interesting mechanism that allows the government of an 
autonomous Bougainville to gradually assume control of various responsibilities.  One of 
the best examples of institution building in the Bougainville peace agreement comes in 
the provisions related to the establishment of the Bougainville Public Service.  The 
National Government’s Public Service apparatus will remain in Bougainville in the 
beginning, and then will undergo a transitional period that will result in their conversion 
in to a Bougainville Public Service, responsible to the autonomous Bougainville 
Government.80 Similar provisions apply to the Bougainville Police and the Bougainville 
Correctional Institutional Services (CIS).81 In an interestingly hands-off approach on the 
part of the government of Papua New Guinea, the peace agreement provides that the 
costs of maintaining the post-agreement, pre-referendum level of autonomy in 
Bougainville will be shared by the autonomous Bougainville Government and the 
National Government.82 The autonomous Bougainville Government will be able to 
collect Bougainville taxes as well as, by agreement, certain National-level taxes.83 
74 See id at paras. 47-48, available at 
http://www.usip.org/library/pa/bougainville/bougain_20010830_B_04_06.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2007), 
75 See id at para. 49. 
76 See id at para. 51. 
77 See id at para. 52. 
78 See id at paras. 209-239, available at 
http://www.usip.org/library/pa/bougainville/bougain_20010830_B_10_12.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2007). 
79 See id at para. 312, available at 
http://www/usip.org/library/pa/bougainville/bougain_20010830_C_F.html#C (last visited Jan. 30, 2007) 
(Though para. 312 is not marked, its location can be inferred from the various sub-sections that fall 
between paras. 311 and 315). 
80 See id at paras 201-208, available at 
http://www.usip.org/library/pa/bougainville/bougain_20010830_B_10_12.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2007). 
81 See id at paras 209-262. 
82 See id at para. 136, available at 
http://www.usip.org/library/pa/bougainville/bougain_20010830_B_07_09.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2007). 
83 See id at para. 146. 
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In a briefing to the UN Security Council, Assistant Secretary General Danilo Turk, of the 
UN Department of Political Affiars, showed the international community’s continued 
commitment to institution building in Bougainville, as evidenced in a May 2004 UN 
Security Council press release.84 Mr. Türk’s statements show that the Bougainville 
Interim Provisional Government received support from the Law and Justice Programs of 
AusAID, NZAID, the Australian Federal Police, the United Nations Observer Mission in 
Bougainville (UNOMB), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United 
Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF).85 Statements from the representatives of Germany, 
Chile, Spain, Romania, Brazil, France, Philippines, China, Angola, the United Kingdom, 
the Russian Federation, Pakistan, New Zealand (speaking on behalf of the Pacific Islands 
Forum Group), Japan, and Fiji underlined the importance of the international 
community’s continued involvement in institution building to support the peace 
process.86 
In particular, AusAID’s Framework for AusAID Assistance to Bougainville 2004-2008 
outlined three broad objectives for Australian aid to Bougainville: helping implement 
autonomy and re-establish public administration; improving essential service delivery; 
and expanding agricultural income-generating opportunities.87 It also provides funding 
through the Governance and Implementation Fund.88 Over the medium to long-term, 
Australia expects that this fund will contribute toward improved public expenditure 
management and development outcomes, public sector reforms, better coordination of 
donor assistance, and transfer of essential powers from the PNG Government to 
Bougainville consistent with the autonomy provision of the Bougainville peace 
agreement.89 These objectives fit well within the core earned sovereignty element of 
institution building. 
 
The use of the core elements of shared sovereignty and institution building will hopefully 
allow the autonomous Bougainville Government to obtain the basic skills necessary to 
effectively assert itself as either an autonomous or sovereign entity upon determination of 
Bougainville’s final status in the upcoming referendum.  In an effort to ensure that the 
necessary skills are acquired in a timely and effective fashion the Bougainville peace 
agreement implements, to varying degrees, all three of the so-called optional elements of 
earned sovereignty: phased sovereignty, conditional sovereignty, and constrained 
sovereignty.  As was acknowledged by Williams and Jannotti Pecci, use of the optional 
elements are not necessary in every case of earned sovereignty.90 They do however, in 
this case, provide useful tools to facilitate the interim period before a decision on final 
status for Bougainville.  
 
84 See United Nations Security Council press release, SC/8086 (2004). 
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 See Australian Government AusAID: Australian Aid to Bougainville, 
http://www.ausaid.gov.au/country/png/bougainville.cfm (last visited January 30, 2007). 
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Williams and Jannotti Pecci, supra note 2 at 367 (Regarding phased sovereignty.  The author contends 
that this belief, that phased sovereignty need not be present in all instances of earned sovereignty, extends 
to all three of the optional elements.). 
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The Bougainville peace agreement relies to a greater extent upon phased sovereignty, and 
possibly constrained sovereignty, than it does upon conditional sovereignty.  The quid 
pro quo arrangements are fewer and farther between.  In the case of Bougainville, the 
timer is set for between ten and fifteen years, nearly all the ingredients have been added, 
and the most important question that remains, to be decided in the upcoming referendum, 
is Bougainville’s final status. 
 
The “timer” of phased sovereignty is evident throughout the Bougainville peace 
agreement.  One of the “three pillars” of the agreement is the right of Bougainvilleans to 
hold a referendum to decide their final status, which will be held no sooner than ten 
years, and no later than fifteen years, after the election of an autonomous Bougainville 
Government.91 The gradual assumption of powers and duties by the autonomous 
Bougainville Government in the areas of Public Service, Police Service, and CIS, also 
shows use of phased sovereignty.92 
The Bougainville peace agreement also contains the quid pro quo arrangement that 
embodies conditional sovereignty.  According to the Bougainville peace agreement, in 
order for the referendum on Bougainville independence to take place the conditions of 
“weapons disposal” and “good governance” must be met.  The autonomous Bougainville 
Government’s success in meeting these conditions will allow the referendum to proceed 
within the specified timeframe, at least 10 but no more than 15 years after the signing of 
the Bougainville peace agreement.93 
These conditions are not terribly onerous, as long as the stakeholders remain committed 
to the peace process.  Weapons disposal has been accomplished under international 
monitoring,94 and “good governance” is so vague that it will be difficult for the 
autonomous Bougainville Government to fail as long as the National Government 
remains committed to the peace process, and especially to institution building in 
autonomous Bougainville. 
 
The implementation of the weapons disposal programs in Bougainville has been almost a 
textbook example of conditional sovereignty.  “With the completion of the second phase 
of weapons collection, the Bougainville peace process could proceed with the remaining 
tasks, including finalization of the constitution and the holding of elections, leading to the 
establishment of an autonomous government […].”95 The United Nations Political Office 
in Bougainville’s verification and certification of the completion of stage II of the 
Weapons Disposal Plan in July 2003 triggered the constitutional process of bringing the 
Constitutional Amendment and the Organic Law on Peace-Building in Bougainville into 
 
91 See Bougainville Peace Agreement, supra note 73 at Introduction, Pillar 2. 
92 See id at paras. 201-262. 
93 See id at para. 312. 
94 Bougainville Peace Process: History of the Peace Process, Australian Government Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade, available at http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/png/bougainville/ (last visited July 9, 
2006) (“In May 2005, U.N.O.M.B. declared the weapons disposal program complete and verified the 
situation on Bougainville as being conducive to holding elections.”). 
95 United Nations Security Council press release, SC/7839 (2003). 
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full operation.96 As of May 2004 the Bougainville Constitutional Commission was 
working on a draft constitution for the autonomous Bougainville, which was to be 
submitted to the Bougainville Constitutional Assembly (BCA) in June 2004.  Following 
adoption by the BCA it would be submitted to the National Government of Papua New 
Guinea for endorsement, which was expected to take place by the end of July.97 The 
Bougainville Interim Provincial Government had also started preparations for the election 
of the autonomous Bougainville Government, including establishment of the Ministry for 
Peace and Autonomy.98 
The 10 to 15 year period prior to the referendum on Bougainville independence also acts 
as a form of constrained sovereignty.  It could be argued that the current, pre-referendum 
status of the autonomous Bougainville is a test of constrained sovereignty, giving 
Bougainvilleans an idea of what it would be like to remain an autonomous province of 
Papua New Guinea.  After this limited period of constrained sovereignty the people of 
Bougainville will have the opportunity to choose whether to remain autonomous or seek 
independence from the National government.99 Should the benefits of continued 
autonomy outweigh those of full independence at that time a form of entirely consensual, 
permanent, increased constitutional autonomy could result, based in constrained 
sovereignty. 
 
The Bougainville peace agreement is one of the best, if not the best, embodiment of an 
earned sovereignty approach to conflict resolution.  The parties share sovereignty over 
Bougainville for a period of time as its institutions are developed, therefore satisfying two 
of the three core elements of earned sovereignty.  The parties also use all three of the so-
called optional elements, to varying degrees, as means by which to share sovereignty and 
build the nascent institutions of the autonomous Bougainville.  The 10-15 year waiting 
period prior to the referendum on final status is evidence of the use of phased 
sovereignty.  It is a particularly good example of phased sovereignty, in fact, because it 
provides a roadmap for the transfer of increased power and responsibility from the 
national government to the government of autonomous Bougainville, particularly in the 
areas of the Public Service, Police Service, and CIS.  Bougainville can move forward 
along the path to the referendum on independence, using the method of conditional 
sovereignty, due to the success of the weapons disposal program.  Until the determination 
of final status, which will satisfy the third core element of earned sovereignty, the 
autonomous Bougainville will exist in a kind of limbo of constrained sovereignty, as 
powers are slowly devolved from national institutions to those of the province.  For these 
reasons, Bougainville is probably one of the best relatively recent examples of the use of 
earned sovereignty to determine the final status of an emerging state at the end of a 
conflict. 
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97 See United Nations Security Council press release, SC/8086, supra note 87. 
98 Id.
99 See generally Bougainville Peace Agreement, supra note 73. 
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C. Aceh 
 
The peace agreement signed between the Government of Indonesia (GoI) and the Free 
Aceh Movement (GAM)100 is relatively recent example of earned sovereignty moving at 
breakneck speed.  The conflict between the Indonesian Government and GAM has cost 
over 9,000 lives since its beginning in 1976.101 However, since the signing of the 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the GoI and GAM on August 15, 2005, 
steady progress has been made.102 When taken together, the text of the MoU and its thus-
far successful implementation shows a valuable perspective on the application of the 
various elements of earned sovereignty, particularly the use of constrained sovereignty to 
end a seemingly intractable conflict.103 
The use of shared sovereignty in resolving the GoI/GAM conflict begins in the preamble 
of the August 15, 2005, MoU.  The second paragraph commits the parties to, “creating 
conditions within which the government of the Acehnese people can be manifested 
through a fair and democratic process within the unitary state and constitution of the 
Republic of Indonesia.”104 This statement offers an initial hint that the GoI and GAM 
will share competencies in the post-MoU environment.  The hint is confirmed in Section 
1, which discusses the Law on the Governing of Aceh that had to, according to the MoU, 
enter into force no later than March 31, 2006 and be promulgated by the GoI.105 The 
principals on which the Law on the Governing of Aceh should be based are laid out in 
Paragraph 1.1.2 of the MoU and call for such measures as granting authority to the 
Acehnese government in all public affairs except in foreign affairs, external defense, 
national security, monetary and fiscal matters, justice and freedom of religion;106 that the 
GoI will consult with the government of Aceh and obtain its consent from the Acehnese 
legislature on international agreements that relate to matters of special interest to Aceh;107 
decisions by Indonesia’s legislature regarding Aceh will be taken in consultation with and 
with the consent of Aceh’s legislature;108 and, finally, that administrative measures taken 
by the GoI regarding Aceh will be implemented in consultation with and with the consent 
 
100 Aceh Rebels Sign Peace Agreement, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4151980.stm (last visited 
Sep. 26, 2006). 
101 See, International Crisis Group Briefing, Aceh: A New Chance For Peace, Asia Briefing No. 40, 
Jakarta/Brussels, Aug. 15, 2005 
,http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/indonesia/b040_aceh___a_new_chance_for_peace.doc 
(last visited Jul. 13, 2006). 
102 ECONOMIST, Aceh: Hope Fragile but Still Alive, Vol. 377, No. 8450, p. 43 (October 29th – November 
4th 2005). 
103 See Aceh rebels surrender last arms, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4541566.stm (last visited 
January 30, 2007) (stating that on 19 December 2005 rebels from the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) handed 
in the final 35 of 840 weapons they agreed to turn over under the August 15 MOU); see also Indonesia 
completes Aceh pull-out, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4545116.stm (last visited January 30, 
2007)(in which a spokesman for the Indonesian military stated that security services were on target to meet 
the 31 December 2005 deadline for withdrawals).  
104 MoU, supra note 21. 
105 See id. para. 1.1.1. 
106 See id. para. 1.1.2(a). 
107 See id. para. 1.1.2(b). 
108 See id. para. 1.1.2(c). 
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of the head of Aceh’s administration.109 According to the MoU, the Law on the 
Governing of Aceh would allow the Acehnese people to have the opportunity to choose 
many national symbols, such as the determination of the name of Aceh, the titles of 
senior elected officials, and the regional symbol, flag, crest and hymn.110 The GoI is also 
obligated under the MoU to facilitate the establishment of Aceh-based political parties 
that meet national criteria.  It is the GoI’s responsibility under the MoU to create the 
political and legal conditions for the establishment of local political parties in Aceh.111 
The MoU also provides the Acehnese government the opportunity to self-govern in a 
number of other substantive ways, particularly in economic matters.  For example, Aceh 
has the right to raise funds with external loans, set interest rates beyond those set by 
Indonesia’s Central Bank, raise taxes to fund official internal activities, conduct trade and 
business internally and internationally, and seek foreign direct investment and tourism.112 
Aceh also has jurisdiction over living natural resources in its surrounding territorial 
waters.113 
Importantly, under the MoU Aceh is entitled to retain 70 percent of the revenues from all 
current and future hydrocarbon deposits and other natural resources in Acehnese territory 
and in its surrounding territorial seas.114 In order to develop these resources, the MoU 
grants Aceh the right to conduct the development and administration of all seaports and 
airports within its territory, the right to enjoy free trade with all other parts of the 
Republic of Indonesia, and direct and unhindered sea and air access to foreign 
countries.115 
The court system of Aceh is also touched by shared sovereignty.  Under the MoU, an 
independent and impartial court system will be established for Aceh within the judicial 
system of the Republic of Indonesia.116 The appointment of the Chief of the organic 
police forces, and prosecutors, shall be approved by the head of the Aceh administration, 
which will also consult in their recruitment and training in compliance with the 
applicable national standards.117 These provisions in particular show a concrete example 
of shared sovereignty, with both the Aceh government and the GoI participating in the 
selection and training of the judiciary and forces of order. 
 
As a separate and distinct entity, a Commission for Truth and Reconciliation will be 
established for Aceh by the Indonesian Commission of Truth and Reconciliation in order 
to formulate and determine reconciliation measures.118 
109 See id. para. 1.1.2(d). 
110 See id paras. 1.1.3 and 1.1.5. 
111 See id para. 1.2.1. 
112 See id paras. 1.3.1 and 1.3.2. 
113 See id para. 1.3.3. 
114 See id para. 1.3.4. 
115 See id paras. 1.3.5 – 1.3.7. 
116 See id para. 1.4.3. 
117 See id para. 1.4.4. 
118 See id para. 2.3. 
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On a level affecting former combatants directly, both the GoI and Acehnese authorities 
will establish a Reintegration Fund under the administration of Aceh in order to facilitate 
the reintegration of persons who participated in GAM activities, including former 
combatants, pardoned political prisoners and affected civilians, into civil society.119 In 
order to deal with unmet claims of those affected by the conflict the GoI and Aceh will 
establish a Joint Settlement Commission.120 Former GAM combatants will also have the 
right to seek employment in the organic police and organic military forces in Aceh 
without discrimination and in conformity with national standards.121 These provisions 
again show important instances of shared sovereignty between Aceh and the GoI.  
Though many of these programs are to be administered by the government of Aceh, few 
of them could be allowed or funded without the good graces of the GoI. 
 
The MoU provides a number of specific provisions that would fall into the category of 
institution building.  These provisions are designed to help Aceh build its internal 
institutions, and to supervise them as they gain competency.  For example, the MoU 
provides for outside auditors to verify the collection and allocation of revenues between 
the GoI and Aceh.  The auditors will communicate the results to the head of the Aceh 
administration.122 
The MoU also provides that both stakeholders will take part in the post-tsunami 
reconstruction effort.  In particular, GAM will nominate representatives to participate in 
the commission established to help post-tsunami reconstruction, also known as the 
BRR.123 
From a legal and policy standpoint, one of the most important aspects of the MoU is the 
extent to which it addresses the rule of law and a fair and efficient judicial system.  
Section 1.4.2 of the MoU is therefore critical, in that it states, broadly, that the legislature 
of Aceh will redraft its legal code on the basis of universal principles of human rights.124 
Not only that, but the MoU goes so far as to dictate that a Human Rights Court will be 
established for Aceh.125 
One of the most important examples of institution building in the MoU is the 
establishment of an Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM), an international body tasked with 
a number of important responsibilities.126 The AMM successfully completed its mission 
in December 2006.127 The MoU tasked the AMM with monitoring the demobilization 
 
119 See id para. 3.2.3. 
120 See id para. 3.2.6. 
121 See id para. 3.2.7. 
122 See id para. 1.3.8. 
123 See id para. 1.3.9. 
124 See id para. 1.4.2. 
125 See id para. 2.2. 
126 Id at para. 5.1 (“An Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) will be established by the European Union and 
ASEAN contributing countries with the mandate to monitor the implementation of the commitments taken 
by the parties in this Memorandum of Understanding.”). 
127 See Peace monitors end Aceh mission, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6181857.stm (last visited 
Jan. 5, 2007) (The AMM formally ended its mission in Aceh after successful local and gubernatorial 
elections, which took place on December 11, 2006).   
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and decommissioning of GAM, the relocation of non-organic military and police troops, 
the reintegration of active GAM members, the human rights situation, and the “process of 
legislation change.”  It also provided that the AMM would provide assistance in the 
human rights field, ruling on disputed amnesty cases, investigating and ruling on 
complaints and alleged violations of the MoU, and establishing and maintaining liaison 
and good cooperation with the parties.128 These provisions show not only a commitment 
on the part of the two stakeholders to help Aceh attain a measure of self-sufficiency; they 
also show the degree to which the international community, in the form of the EU and 
ASEAN, was committed to a lasting political settlement. 
 
The third core element of earned sovereignty, determination of final status, is 
contemplated by the MoU.  The first example comes in the Preamble, which specifically 
states that “The parties commit themselves to creating conditions within which the 
government of the Acehnese people can be manifested through a fair and democratic 
process within the unitary state and constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. [Emphasis 
added]”129 This statement indicates that Aceh’s final status, at least under the MoU, is to 
remain within the Republic of Indonesia.  The MoU does not provide a referendum or 
other mechanism for determining possible Acehnese independence.130 
This conclusion is supported by the MoU’s operational paragraphs.  For example, 
Paragraph 1.2.3 states that free and fair local elections will be organized under the new 
Lao on the Governing Aceh,131 which is a law set to be enacted by the GoI.  Paragraph 
1.2.6 provides for full participation of the Acehnese people in local and national 
elections in accordance with the constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. [Emphasis 
added]132 The Law on the Governing of Aceh will be promulgated, seemingly, by the 
GoI.133 Paragraph 1.2.1 of the MoU specifically states that the GoI will facilitate the 
establishment of Aceh-based political parties that meet national criteria.134 Additionally, 
the Acehnese court system will be set up within the judicial system of the Republic of 
Indonesia.135 Paragraph 3.2.1 confirms that the Acehnese people are citizens of the 
Republic of Indonesia.136 Finally, Paragraph 1.1.2 sets out the specific areas in which the 
GoI retains competence.137 Though the MoU does not tot provide for Acehnese 
independence it does provide Aceh with final status and, therefore, satisfies the third core 
element of earned sovereignty. 
 
The MoU also contains all three of the optional elements of earned sovereignty.  The 
dates set in the MoU when the government of Aceh will obtain competence in various 
areas shows phased sovereignty.  Conditional sovereignty is shown in the MoU’s 
 
128 See id para. 5.1(a)-(h). 
129 MoU, supra note 21 at Preamble, para. 2. 
130 See generally MoU, supra note 21. 
131 See MoU, supra note 21 at para. 1.2.3. 
132 See id, para. 1.2.6. 
133 See id para. 1.1.2(a). 
134 See id para. 1.2.1. 
135 See id, para. 1.4.3. 
136 See id para. 3.2.1. 
137 See generally id para. 1.1.2. 
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disarmament provisions.  Finally, and perhaps most interestingly, the restrictions on the 
competency of the future Acehnese government, as outlined in the MoU, provide an 
excellent example of constrained sovereignty. 
 
Phased sovereignty is best exemplified in the MoU in the provisions involving elections.  
Paragraph 1.2.2 shows that, upon signing the MoU, the people of Aceh had the right to 
nominate candidates during elections to be held in Aceh in April 2006.138 Elections were 
to take place in April 2006 for the head of the Aceh administration, with elections for an 
Acehnese legislature coming in 2009.139 Finally, the legislature of Aceh, prior to 2009, 
will not be entitled to enact any laws without the consent of the head of the Aceh 
administration.140 
Conditional sovereignty and its hallmark quid pro quo arrangement plays a smaller role 
in the MoU than in the Sudan and Bougainville peace agreements.  The MoU’s best 
example of conditional sovereignty is expressed in Paragraphs 4.2 to 4.6, which concern 
the decommissioning of GAM’s arms, ammunition, and explosives congruent with the 
relocation of non-organic military and police forces.  Paragraph 4.4 stated that the 
decommissioning of GAM armaments would begin on September 15, 2005, would be 
executed in four stages, and would be concluded by December 31, 2005.  Under 
paragraph 4.6, the relocation of non-organic military and police forces was set to begin 
on September 15, 2005.  It would be executed in four stages in parallel with GAM’s 
decommissioning “immediately after each stage has been verified by the AMM,” and 
concluded by December 31, 2005.141 The language of the agreement therefore showed 
that GAM would decommission its arms in four stages and, as each stage was verified by 
the AMM, the GoI would relocate non-organic military and police personnel.  This 
arrangement showed that the MoU incorporated a form of conditional sovereignty, albeit 
to a rather limited degree. 
 
The prevalence of constrained sovereignty in the MoU makes it a particularly interesting 
document in terms of earned sovereignty.  In summary, the MoU conveys to the people 
of Aceh an expanded bundle of rights to self-government, while maintaining important 
links, including constitutional links, to the Republic of Indonesia.  The discussions of 
shared sovereignty and final status, supra, illustrate this point.  The preamble of the MoU 
reaffirms Aceh’s constitutional ties to the Republic of Indonesia and highlights 
Indonesia’s status as a unitary state.142 The burden fell upon the GoI to promulgate the 
Law on the Governing of Aceh,143 upon which the entire peace agreement depends.144 
138 See id para. 1.2.2. 
139 See id para. 1.2.3. 
140 See id para. 1.2.4. 
141 See id paras. 4.2-4.6. 
142 See id at Preamble para. 2. 
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144 See Indonesia MPs Back Aceh Autonomy, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/asia-
pacific/5168718.stm (last visited Jul. 11, 2006) (The Indonesian parliament unanimously passed a new law 
in July 2006 giving more autonomy to Aceh.  The law was the product of the peace agreement between the 
GoI and GAM and gave Aceh more autonomy than any other province in Indonesia.  Some of GAM’s 
leaders, however, were unsatisfied with certain aspects of the law); see also Peace monitors end Aceh 
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Even once that milestone is accomplished any Aceh-based political parties must meet 
national criteria.145 These provisions, which form the four corners of a concession on the 
part of GAM in which it foregoes its demand for independence,146 are wonderful 
examples of an effective use of constrained sovereignty.   
 
In this instance circumstances were such that both parties were able to come to an 
agreement in order to end the conflict following the tragedy of the December 2004 
tsunami.  The method chosen by the parties included all of the elements of earned 
sovereignty to various degrees.  The MoU includes provisions for shared sovereignty and 
institution building as well as using the so-called “optional” elements of earned 
sovereignty.  Aceh’s final status, at least for the moment, may be inferred from the text of 
the agreement, and it provides an excellent example of constrained sovereignty.  In the 
very particular context of the Aceh conflict, the parties agreed that constrained 
sovereignty could provide a mutually beneficial outcome, even though it fell short of 
Acehnese independence. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
It therefore appears that even a pared-down version of earned sovereignty, which uses the 
core elements but may not use the optional elements, provides a useful tool for attaining 
peace between states and susbstate entities.  The CPA uses all of the core elements but 
does not use all of the optional elements, particularly constrained sovereignty.  The 
Bougainville peace agreement follows a similar pattern.  In both cases the peace 
agreements themselves contain no true restraints upon the bundle of rights the substate 
entity may eventually obtain, and the final status of Southern Sudan or an autonomous 
Bougainville may well be full-fledged statehood.  The MoU between the Government of 
Indonesia and GAM takes a completely different approach and uses all the core and 
optional elements of earned sovereignty.  The use of constrained sovereignty, wherein 
Aceh’s final status is a form of heightened autonomy instead of statehood, is of particular 
importance in the MoU.  Indeed, it has allowed the peace process to proceed successfully 
through the completion of the AMM’s mission.  It thus appears that the most important 
elements of earned sovereignty to apply are the core elements – shared sovereignty, 
institution building, and determination of final status.  The optional elements, however, 
may be used to a great extent, sparingly, or not at all depending on the particular 
circumstances of the conflict.  As illustrated by the MoU, the optional elements retain 
their usefulness as tools to help implement and secure the use of the core elements of 
earned sovereignty.  In doing so, they ensure earned sovereignty’s continued usefulness 
as a tool of conflict resolution. 
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